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Abstract  
To evaluate the distributional impact of remittances in origin communities, prior research studied 
how migrants’ selectivity by wealth varies with migration prevalence in the community or prior 
migration experience of the individual. This study considers both patterns, and examines 
selectivity separately in low and high prevalence communities and for first-time and repeat 
migrants. Based on data from 18,042 household heads in 119 Mexican communities from the 
Mexican Migration Project, the analyses show that (i) first-time migrants in low prevalence 
communities come from poor households, while repeat migrants in high prevalence communities 
belong to wealthy households, and (ii) higher amounts of remittances reach wealthy households. 
These results suggest that repeat migration and remittances may be mechanisms for wealth 
accumulation in the study communities. Descriptive analyses associate these mechanisms with 
increasing wealth disparities between households with and without migrants, especially in high 
prevalence communities. The study, similar to prior findings, shows the importance of repeat 
migration trips, which, given sustained remittances, may amplify the wealth gap between 
migrants and non-migrants in migrant-sending communities. The study also qualifies prior 
findings by differentiating between low and high prevalence communities and observing a 
growing wealth gap only in the latter. 
 
   2 
Scholarly interest in remittances, funds and goods sent by migrants to their origin families and 
communities, has grown dramatically in recent years. Estimates indicate that international 
remittances to developing countries have reached US$240 billion annually in 2007, becoming 
the second largest source of external finance for these countries after foreign direct investment 
(Ratha and Xu 2008). Remittance flows relax budget and credit constraints of origin households, 
and create investment opportunities in origin communities (Durand et al. 1996a; Durand, Parrado 
and Massey 1996b; Rapoport and Docquier 2006; Rempel and Lobdell 1978; Stark and Levhari 
1982; Taylor 1999). These flows also provide a potential pathway for income redistribution to 
the most deprived regions of the world (Jones 1998).  
Remittance flows are particularly important in Latin America, the most unequal region of 
the world (Hoffman and Centeno 2003) and the recipient of 25 percent of all remittances to 
developing countries (Castro and Tuirán 2000; Ratha and Xu 2008). The roots of disparities in 
the region have been traced back to the distribution of land tenure and political influence by the 
colonial order (Gonzalez 1970; Paige 1997), and more recently to the weakness of democratic 
institutions (Huber et al. 2006). Research finds that inequality in the region has increased in the 
past decades (Morley 2001). Studies have linked this trend to international remittances, but 
yielded conflicting findings. In rural Mexico, for example, Taylor (1992) and Taylor, Adams and 
Mora (2009) found an equalizing effect of remittances on the income distribution, whereas Mora 
(2005) and Acosta et al. (2008) observed the opposite pattern. 
To reconcile such conflicting empirical patterns, in their seminal work, Stark, Taylor and 
Yitzhaki (1986) considered how migrants’ selectivity by wealth varies with migration prevalence 
in a community. The authors argued that inequality increases in the early stages of migration, 
due to positive selectivity of initial migrants by income or wealth, but gradually levels off and   3 
declines as a community reaches high levels of migration. Taylor et al. (2009) and Koechlin and 
Leon (2007) observed this relationship at the macro level, while in a recent study, McKenzie and 
Rapoport (2007) tested its underlying assumption at the micro level. Using Mexican data, the 
latter authors showed that, in communities with a high prevalence of migration, first-time 
migrants were less likely to be selected on wealth; hence, remittances reached poor households 
and decreased the overall wealth inequality.  
Similar to this prior work, we study how individuals’ wealth status is associated with 
their propensity to migrate and remit to draw implications for inequality. We focus on the largest 
migration and remittance flows in Latin America, between the United States and Mexico, using 
data from the Mexican Migration Project (MMP), which contain information on the migration 
and remittance decisions of more than 18,000 household heads from 119 communities between 
1965 and 2008. Similar to Stark et al. (1986), we study patterns of wealth selectivity separately 
in low and high migration prevalence communities. Inspired by qualitative case studies of Mines 
and Massey (1985) and Jones (1995), we also consider the cumulative effects of migration, and 
study patterns of selectivity separately for first-time and repeat migrants.  
 
BACKGROUND  
Remittance flows to developing countries have been increasing consistently in the past decade, 
reaching 20 percent of the GDP in many countries in Latin America and Africa (WorldBank 
2008). To evaluate the distributional impact of remittances, some researchers have used macro-
level data to link the trends in remittance flows to trends in economic inequality (Acosta et al. 
2006; Koechlin and Leon 2007). Others have relied on household-level data and inequality 
decomposition techniques to measure the contribution of remittances to overall inequality   4 
(Adams 1989, 1992; Barham and Boucher 1998; Stark et al. 1986; Taylor 1992; Taylor et al. 
2009). These studies have yielded conflicting findings. 
Adams (1989), for example, observed that international remittances increased the 
inequality in the distribution of income in rural communities in Egypt, but not in rural Pakistan 
(Adams 1992). Researchers also observed contradictory findings in this paper’s national context, 
Mexico. Stark et al. (1986), Taylor (1992) and Taylor et al. (2009), for instance, all showed that 
remittances reduced income inequality, while Mora (2005) observed the opposite pattern.  
These studies, with the exception of Adams (1989), assumed remittances to be an 
exogenous source of income. A number of scholars argued for treating remittances as a substitute 
for migrants’ local income (Arroyo and Berumen 2000; Canales and Montiel 2004). Barham and 
Boucher (1998) showed that, when treated as a substitute for local income rather than an 
exogenous transfer, remittances increased, rather than decreased income inequality in Nicaragua. 
Similarly, Acosta (2008) found that remittances had an overall inequality-reducing effect in 10 
Latin American countries, but this effect disappeared in some countries if remittances were 
considered endogenous.  
Stark et al. (1986) attributed these conflicting patterns to a link between migrant 
selectivity and inequality. The authors envisioned an inverted-U relationship of income 
inequality to migration prevalence, akin to a Kuznets curve, which suggests a similar relationship 
between inequality and economic growth (Kuznets 1955).  Inequality is expected to increase in 
the initial take-off period of migration, and then to gradually level off and decline as a 
community reaches high levels of migration. The reason offered for this pattern is the decline in 
selectivity of migration with increasing migration prevalence. Initial migrants in a community 
incur high costs to migration, and typically come from middle or upper parts of the income   5 
distribution. As migration gains prevalence, experiences of prior migrants help mitigate the costs 
of migration, and individuals from lower income strata can afford to migrate. Therefore, in 
communities where migration is already prevalent, remittances are expected to decrease 
inequality, with the opposite effect in communities at the initial migration stages. 
This curvilinear relationship was supported with evidence from various settings. In their 
original study, Stark et al. (1986) found a more equalizing effect of remittances in a Mexican 
village that had a history of U.S. migration, compared to another that had only recently begun to 
send migrants. Extending this analysis to rural households from 14 Mexican states, Taylor et al. 
(2009) showed that inequality-reducing effects of remittances were concentrated in regions with 
high migration prevalence. Koechlin and Leon (2007) generalized this result with data from 78 
countries. 
In recent work, McKenzie and Rapoport (2007) developed an individual-level model of 
migrant selectivity to study the relationship between migration prevalence in a community and 
changes in wealth inequality. Using two data sets from the Mexico-U.S. migration system, 
including the MMP data used here, the authors showed that, in communities with high migration 
prevalence, first-time migrants are less likely to be selected on wealth; therefore, remittances 
reach mostly poor households and reduce the overall inequality. 
While these findings largely supported Stark et al.’s (1986) claim of an inverted U-
relationship of inequality to migration prevalence, results from qualitative case studies provided 
abundant counter evidence. Comparing four Mexican communities at progressively advanced 
stages of migration, Jones (1998) suggested an N-shaped pattern of inequality. Specifically, in 
the initial ‘innovation’ stage, migrants are positively selected from households that are already 
well off, and socio-economic inequality increases in a community. In the subsequent ‘early   6 
adopter’ stage, migrants are drawn from an increasingly diverse pool, and inequality decreases. 
In the final ‘late adopter’ stage, migration reaches saturation, and with no new migrants to be 
drawn in, socio-economic inequality increases once again as migrants continue to advance 
economically while non-migrants fall further behind.  
Focusing on single or a few communities in Mexico, other scholars observed a gap 
between migrants and non-migrants. Reichert (1982) found a highly differentiated class structure 
in a community in Michoacán, where legal U.S. migrants occupied the highest economic ranks, 
followed by undocumented migrants and non-migrants. Mines (1981) and Mines and de Janvry 
(1982) reported wealth disparities in a community of Zacatecas, where committed U.S. migrants 
owned more land than either temporary migrants or non-migrants. Dinerman (1978) and Wiest 
(1973) observed a similar pattern of economic differentiation in Michoacán as did Cohen (2001) 
in Oaxaca.  
A number of studies highlighted the cumulative aspects of migration-induced inequality. 
Mines and Massey (1985) noted an increasing concentration of land in the hands of U.S. 
migrants in two communities in Zacatecas and Michoacán. These migrants accumulated more 
land and properties, the longer they had been migrating. Similarly, in his study of four 
communities in Zacatecas, Jones (1995) observed that migrants’ possessions increased in 
proportion to their experience in the United States.  
 
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
Data 
This study employs the Mexican Migration Project (MMP) data from 119 communities 
located in major migrant-sending areas in 21 Mexican States. Each community was surveyed   7 
once in this period, during the winter months, when migrants are likely to visit their origin 
households.
1 Detailed migration information was obtained from about 200 randomly selected 
household heads, mostly men, in each community. These data, collected retrospectively in a life 
history survey, allow us to observe migration and remittance decisions of more than 18,000 
household heads from multiple communities (ranging from small villages to metropolitan areas) 
over several years. 
The MMP data are not strictly representative of the Mexican population. Yet, prior work 
found that these data yield an accurate profile of the U.S. migrants in Mexico, consistent with 
national data (Durand, Massey and Zenteno 2001; Zenteno and Massey 1998).  The data contain 
information on migrants who have returned to Mexico, or who have at least one household 
member remaining there, and cannot capture permanent migrants who have taken their whole 
household to the United States. A selective focus on migrants with at least one household 
member in Mexico is not problematic given our interest in the inequality in origin communities, 
which, by definition, no longer include migrant households living permanently in the United 
States. The exclusion of permanent U.S. migrants does, however, lead us to overestimate the 
amount of remittances sent by Mexican migrants. Specifically, our monthly remittance estimates 
for first-time ($405) and repeat ($436) migrants, shown in Table 1, are higher than those of 
Banco de México, which put monthly remittances in the range of $267 to $410 in 2000-2005. 
These latter estimates, however, also overstate the actual amounts (Tuirán and Santibáñez 2006) 
as they conflate family remittances with private transfers (Lozano 2003). Indeed, more reliable 
                                                 
1 Detailed information about the MMP is available at http://mmp.opr.princeton.edu. The 5 
communities surveyed as part of the pilot study in 1982 are excluded, as are the data collected 
non-randomly from a small number of migrants in the United States.   8 
estimates, such as Lowell and de la Garza’s (2002) based on U.S. household surveys, yield the 
much lower average monthly remittance amount of $221. 
 
Modeling Approach 
This study investigates how individuals’ wealth status is associated with their migration and 
remittance behavior to draw implications for inequality. Prior worked showed how wealth affects 
migration differently depending on the prevalence of migration in the community (Stark et al. 
1986) or the prior migration experience of the individual (Jones 1995; Mines and Massey 1985). 
Our analysis considers both patterns. We start with two models to estimate the effect of wealth 
on individuals’ (i) first and (ii) repeat migration trips, and thus, to test whether this effect varies 
by individuals’ prior experience. We then employ four models to estimate the effect of wealth on 
individuals’ (i) first and (ii) repeat migration trips in (iii) low or (iv) high migration prevalence 
communities. These models test how the effect of wealth on migration varies jointly by 
individuals’ prior experience and a community’s migration experience. 
We test how wealth affects the amount of remittances in the overall sample, rather than 
separately for first and repeat migration trips, or in low or high migration prevalence 
communities, to preserve statistical power. Information on remittances is collected for the last 
migration trip only, and available for only a small share of the sample (3,096 out of 487,305 
person-years).  
Because remittances are only observed for migrants, a non-random segment of the 
population, an accurate evaluation of wealth-remittance relationship requires a correction for 
migrant selectivity. To pose the problem formally, let the amount remitted by individual i be 
represented by y1i and governed by the following equation:   9 
y1i = x1iβ1 + ε1i    (1)     
where x represents a vector of independent variables, β is the corresponding vector of 
coefficients, and ε is the identically and normally distributed error term. Let migration decision 
of individual i be represented by a binary dependent variable y2i generated by a probit equation 
and related to an unobserved latent variable y2i
* as follows: 
y2i
* = x2iβ2 + ε2i    (2) 
€ 
y2i =
1   if  y2i
* > 0
0  if  y2i
* ≤ 0
⊧ 
⊨ 
⊩ 
      
We observe y1i if and only if a person migrates (y2i = 1). This leads to a specification where the 
probit equation (2) for migration is completely observed, but for the remittance equation (1), we 
have a selected sample. In the case of a non-zero correlation (ρ) between the error terms 
€ 
ε1i,ε2i ( ), 
separately estimating the migration and remittance equations will lead to selectivity bias in the 
estimates of the latter. We account for this bias with Heckman’s (1979) two-stage selection 
model, which calls for an independent variable, known as an instrument, in the migration 
(selection) equation that is not included in the remittance (outcome) equation. This restriction is 
not strictly required for identification. However, if the set of regressors are identical for the 
selection and outcome equations, the estimation is poor due to high multicollinearity (Berk 
1983).  
  Hoddinott (1994) employed a Heckman two-stage model of remittances to control for 
migrant selectivity in the Kenyan setting. Taylor et al. (2003) and Mora (2005) recently used a 
similar model of selection-correction in the Chinese and Mexican settings, respectively. Both 
studies used an indicator of community migration prevalence as an instrument, but did not test its 
validity for identification. Given that migration prevalence is likely to be related to unobserved   10 
community conditions (e.g., lack of job opportunities), which also affect remittance patterns, one 
might suspect that this instrument may not satisfy the exclusion restriction.  
This study addresses this issue with an alternative instrument, the interaction between 
community migration prevalence and distance to the U.S. border. The intuition is as follows. 
Individuals living in communities far to the border typically face higher costs to migration. The 
detrimental effect of distance on migration should be lower in communities with high migration 
prevalence, as prior migrants provide useful information or help. The effect of distance on the 
amount remitted, however, should not vary with the community migration prevalence. A 
supplementary analysis presented in Appendix B evaluates the validity of these assumptions. 
 
Operational Measures 
The sample for the study is 18,042 household heads from 119 Mexican communities. Life 
history survey provides a panel data set of individuals’ migration decisions from 1965 (the end 
of the Bracero program) to 2008 (the year of the last survey). All the moves an individual makes 
until the survey year are recorded, yet information about remittances is only collected for the last 
migration trip to avoid recall bias. Therefore, the migration model is estimated with data from all 
migration trips, whereas the remittance model is estimated with data from the last trip only. The 
person-year observations are supplemented with contextual information from the household and 
community surveys, several macro-economic indicators provided by Massey and Espinosa 
(1997), and geographic data collected by the author.  
The dependent variables are a binary indicator of whether a person migrated to the United 
States in a year, and the amount of remittances sent or savings brought home by a migrant in that 
year. For the purposes of this study, both transfers are considered as remittances. The total   11 
amount of remittances is computed by multiplying the duration of the last trip by monthly 
remittances and adding up the total savings brought by a migrant upon return.  The monthly 
amount (total divided by the duration of the last trip) is converted to constant US dollars (in year 
2000) and used in logarithm form in analysis.  
  The key independent variable is household wealth. Household income is measured in the 
survey year alone, therefore does not permit a longitudinal analysis. Household land and 
properties, on the other hand, are recorded in each year, and provide useful proxies for household 
wealth. We compute the total value of household land by multiplying the hectares owned with 
the average price of land in the community (in 2000 US$).
2 Focusing on value, rather than 
amount, assures that land owned in a rural area is not treated equally as land in a more expensive, 
urban region. There is no information on average property values in the community survey. We 
use the total number of rooms in household properties as a proxy for their value. Land and 
property measures are used in logarithm form to take into account their skewed distribution, 
lagged by a year to prevent simultaneity with migration decisions, and standardized to mean 0 
and standard deviation 1 for comparability. Figure A1 in Appendix A shows histograms for 
logarithms of land, properties, remittances and savings (non-zero values only), which are 
approximately normal in distribution.  
Several individual characteristics related to migration and remittance behavior are 
included in models: age, sex, education (primary, secondary, advanced), marital status (also if 
spouse is in the United States), and the number of children in the household. Prior research 
shows that individuals are more likely to migrate if they have prior migration experience, or if 
they are related to prior migrants through household or community ties (Massey and Zenteno 
                                                 
2 Municipality or state average prices are used for communities with missing values.    12 
1999). To capture this pattern, we measure individuals’ prior migration experience by their 
accumulated number of U.S. trips. Prior household experience is measured by an indicator of 
whether an individual’s parents were U.S. migrants. Community experience is captured by 
migration prevalence ratio, defined as the proportion of individuals who have ever migrated in a 
community. Level of inequality in community is measured by the gini coefficient of household 
land. Land tenure arrangements are captured with an indicator for whether community ever had 
ejido (communal) land.
3 Agriculture production is highly dependent on weather conditions, and 
differences across communities in this respect are controlled with an indicator of average rainfall 
to the state in the past three years. Community distance to the U.S. border is included as a proxy 
for costs of migrating.
4 State and year indicators account for the geographic or temporal patterns 
not captured with the independent variables.  
Indicators for migrant characteristics are only included in remittance models. Prior 
research finds remittances to be a repayment for migration costs incurred by the household, a 
                                                 
3 Ejido indicator is missing for five communities. We set the indicator to zero in these 
communities to conserve sample size, however, the results remain identical if these communities 
are excluded from analysis. 
4 We tested the robustness of our findings to two alternative measures of community distance to 
the United States: (i) distance to the closest international airport in Mexico, and (ii) distance to 
the closest popular border crossing city, which include Tijuana or El Paso, TX prior to 1993 and 
Laredo, TX, El Centro, CA and Nogales, AZ thereafter according to Orrenius (2006) and Singer 
and Massey (1998). The former measure takes into account the transportation networks in 
Mexico, while the latter considers the shifting enforcement zones in the United States. Both 
measures led to similar results in all models (available upon request).   13 
pattern considered with an indicator for whether family paid for coyote (smuggler) fees. Prior 
work also shows that remittances decrease as migrants’ ties to origin weaken over time (Durand 
et al. 1996a), which is captured by indicators of years since an individual migrated, and whether 
migrant has U.S. documentation. Other control variables are migrants’ monthly wages (in 2000 
US$), and binary indicators for their destination (Northeast, Midwest, South and West).
5 
 
 [TABLE 1] 
 
Table 1 displays means for all variables separately for non-migrants, first-time migrants 
and repeat migrants along with results from cluster-adjusted difference-of-means tests comparing 
first-time migrants to non-migrants, and repeat migrants to first-time migrants. (First-time 
migrants are individuals who have migrated once, considered non-migrants prior to their first 
trip. Repeat migrants are individuals who have migrated more than once.) 
Compared to non-migrants, first-time migrants are significantly younger, more likely to 
be male, married and with a spouse in Mexico or the United States. First-time migrants are more 
likely to have parents who were U.S. migrants, and to live in communities with a high proportion 
of migrants and with prior ejido land arrangements. Interestingly, repeat migrants differ 
significantly from first-time migrants in most variables. Compared to first-time migrants, repeat 
migrants are older, less educated, more likely to be married or to have children. Repeat migrants 
                                                 
5 Because wage in destination is a critical determinant of remittance behavior, migrants with 
missing wage information (about one-third of all migrants) are not used in the analysis. 
Alternative analysis with all the migrants, and without the wage variable, leads to similar wealth 
coefficient estimates (available upon request).   14 
come from communities where migration is already prevalent, and where cultivation may have 
recently suffered from low levels of rainfall. Repeat migrants are also more likely than first-time 
migrants to have documentation in the U.S., and to have higher amounts of savings upon return. 
  Most importantly, repeat migrants are significantly wealthier than both non-migrants and 
first-time migrants. In the average person year, a non-migrant owns $4,191 in land (2000 US 
dollars), an amount that is not statistically different from the $4,907-worth of land owned by 
first-time migrants. A repeat migrant, by contrast, owns $10,584 in land, more than double the 
value owned by non-migrants or first-time migrants (p < 0.05 in difference-of-means test 
adjusted for individual-level clustering). Similarly, both non-migrants and first-time migrants 
own properties with an average of 2 rooms in the year under observation, while repeat migrants 
own properties with more than 3 rooms (p < 0.05). 
Similar to prior research in the Mexican setting, we find that migrants are positively 
selected on wealth (Cohen 2001; Dinerman 1978; Durand and Massey 1992; Massey, Goldring 
and Durand 1994; Mines 1981; Reichert 1981). By separating first-time and repeat migrants, 
however, we provide an alternative explanation for this selectivity. Prior research suggested that 
migrants originate from wealthier households because those households can afford the costs of 
migration. If that were the case, we would expect first-time migrants to be wealthier than non-
migrants. Instead, we see that first-time migrants have similar levels of wealth as non-migrants, 
but are significantly poorer than repeat migrants. This pattern suggests that migrants may be 
accumulating wealth through repeated migration trips to the United States.  
 
[TABLE 2] 
 
   15 
To test the plausibility of this explanation, similar to Jones (1995), we compare the 
average household wealth across different levels of migration experience. Table 2 shows that the 
average value of land and number of rooms in properties increase with increasing prior U.S. 
trips. Thus, individuals who have taken 1 or 2 trips are significantly wealthier than those with no 
trips, and those with 3 or 4 trips are significantly wealthier than those with 1 or 2 trips, and so on 
(p < 0.05). The only exception to this pattern comes from individuals with 5 or more trips, whose 
land possessions are not significantly more valuable than those of individuals with 3 to 4 trips. 
These findings, based on data from 119 communities in 21 states, generalize similar patterns 
observed by Cohen (2002) in 13 communities in Oaxaca, Jones (1995) in 4 communities in 
Zacatecas, Mines and de Janvry (1982) in a community in Zacatecas, and finally, Mines and 
Massey (1985) in two communities in Zacatecas and Michoacán. 
A stronger test of migrant selectivity, however, requires controlling for various 
contextual factors. Prior research showed how selectivity by wealth depends on the prevalence of 
migration in a community (Massey et al. 1994; Stark et al. 1986) and the level of inequality in 
productive resources (Durand and Massey 1992; Stark and Taylor 1991). Prior work also 
discussed how land tenure arrangements in Mexico shape the distribution of land, and 
consequently, the context for migration (Goldring 1996). Researchers suggested that the ejido 
land system, which granted households use of communal land, but required (until 1992) them to 
farm the land themselves, restricts mobility (Hamilton 2002). Other scholars argued that some 
ejido plots were less suitable for agriculture, thus, many rural households complemented their 
income by sending migrants to the United States (Assies 2008; DeWalt and Rees 1994). 
The analysis below accounts for these contextual factors with community level measures 
of migration experience, land inequality, and ejido arrangements. The analysis also controls for   16 
weather conditions, which affect agricultural production, and consequently, migration flows 
(Munshi 2003). The main patterns of wealth selectivity among migrants identified in the 
descriptive analysis above remain robust to these (and various other individual- and household-
level) controls. 
 
RESULTS 
Migration 
How is wealth status associated with an individual’s propensity to take a first or a repeat 
migration trip? The two columns of Table 3 report the estimated marginal effects of wealth on 
the probability of first and repeat migration from a model which includes controls for 
demographic information, prior migration indicators, community characteristics, fixed effects for 
state and year. Land and property indicators are in logarithm form and standardized to mean 0 
and standard deviation 1. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the individual level. The 
sample in the first column includes non-migrants (individuals who have never migrated) 
observed annually through the year of the survey, and migrants observed annually through the 
year of their first migration. The sample in the second column includes non-migrants observed in 
each year, and repeat migrants observed annually after the year of their first migration. 
 
[TABLE 3] 
 
 
The results indicate that land and property ownership are strongly associated with the 
propensity to migrate, although the direction of the effects differ between first and repeat 
migration. Specifically, one standard deviation increase in the logarithm of land value above its   17 
mean has no effect on the probability of first migration, but generates a 0.08 percentage-point 
increase in the probability of repeat migration. Similarly, one standard deviation increase in the 
logarithm of number of rooms in household properties decreases the probability of first 
migration by 0.03 percentage points, while it increases the probability of repeat migration by 
0.14 percentage-points. (Non-linear terms for wealth indicators, found significant in prior work, 
do not have an effect here, potentially because these indicators are already in logarithm form.)  
The differential effect of wealth on first and repeat migration trips confirms the findings 
of the earlier descriptive analysis. Specifically, even controlling for various individual and 
contextual factors, first-time migrants are likely to be selected from poorer households, while 
repeat migrants are likely to belong to wealthier households. These patterns, similar to those in 
Table 2, suggest that, for repeat migrants, household wealth can be a result of past migration 
behavior.
6  
                                                 
6 The results suggest the potential endogeneity of wealth indicators to migration or remittance 
outcomes, which may bias the empirical conclusions. To address this issue, we lag the household 
wealth indicators by a year. This approach does not solve the endogeneity problem if current 
migration decisions are correlated with past migration, which affect household wealth in the past, 
or if there are omitted variables related to both wealth and migration. We test for this possibility 
with a procedure suggested by Spencer and Berk (1981). We estimate two wealth equations (for 
land and property indicators separately) with exogenous regressors (past rainfall and real interest 
rates, which are likely to affect wealth). We then add the residuals from these equations to the 
migration and remittance models as extra regressors. The coefficients for the regressors are 
jointly insignificant in both the migration (F-statistic = 1.89, p = .39) and remittance (F-statistic 
= 0.16, p = 0.85) models, and the null hypothesis that the wealth indicators are orthogonal to the   18 
Probability of migrating for the first time decreases with age. Probability of taking 
repeated trips increases with age and then declines once a threshold age (around 21) is reached. 
Men are more likely to migrate, partially due to a gender bias in the data, which come from 
household heads alone. Both first-time and repeat migrants are negatively selected on education, 
possibly because educated individuals secure desirable jobs in the domestic labor market, and 
face a high opportunity cost to migrating. In this sample, the likelihood of migrating is lower for 
individuals with secondary education (compared to those with primary education or less), and 
lowest for those with advanced degrees. Individuals are more likely to take a first or repeat 
migration trip if they have a spouse in the United States. Having a spouse in Mexico does not 
affect the first migration probability, but increases the propensity for repeat migration. Having 
young children has no effect on migration. Having family members who are prior U.S. migrants 
and living in a community with a high proportion of prior migrants both increase the likelihood 
of first and repeat migration. Land inequality in a community is associated with a higher 
propensity of repeat migration, while the presence of ejido land is associated with a higher 
propensity of first migration. Rain shortages in a community decrease income from agriculture, 
and are expected to increase migration. In our case, first and repeat migration is higher in states 
that have received higher than average rainfall in the past three years. This surprising positive 
effect may be due to the failure of the state-level rainfall variable to capture the within-state 
variations, which may be higher than the variation between states. Finally, the effect of distance 
                                                                                                                                                             
errors cannot be rejected. These results suggest that the lagged wealth indicators can be treated as 
exogenous to current migration and remittance decisions. Crucially, this treatment does not 
preclude an association between wealth and past migration and remittances, but such an 
association does not seem to bias our estimates.   19 
to the U.S. border is non-linear and depends on the migration prevalence in the community (as 
described in Appendix B).  
 
[TABLE 4] 
 
The results show how migrant selectivity varies over the different stages of individuals’ 
migration careers, and confirm prior findings based on small-scale case studies in the Mexican 
setting (Jones 1995; Mines and Massey 1985). To test another established finding in the 
literature, that migrant selectivity varies over the different stages of a community’s migration 
prevalence (Stark et al. 1986), we estimate the migration models separately in low and high 
migration prevalence communities. We categorize a community as low (high) prevalence in a 
given year if the proportion ever migrated in a community is lower than (equal to or higher than) 
the median proportion across all communities in that year. 
Table 4 reports the estimated marginal effects of wealth on the probability of first and 
repeat migration separately for high (panel A) and low (panel B) migration prevalence 
communities. The results show that the probability of first migration declines with number of 
properties owned, but only in communities with low migration prevalence. The propensity for 
repeat migration, by contrast, increases with both land and property ownership but only in 
communities with high migration prevalence.  
 
Remittances 
How is wealth status related to the amount remitted by migrants? The two columns in Table 5 
present coefficients from the remittance model estimated with OLS and Heckman’s 2-stage least   20 
squares, respectively.  The selectivity-corrected Heckman model estimates indicate that the 
amount of remittances sent by a migrant is strongly related to household land and properties. A 
standard deviation increase in the logarithm of land value and number of properties above the 
mean increases the logarithm of remittances by 0.09 and 0.12, respectively.  A migrant in an 
average wealth household sending $1000 a month would send an additional $89 if household 
land increased by a standard deviation, all else equal. A commensurate increase in household 
properties would bring an additional $130 to the migrant-sending household. The OLS estimates 
in the first column are very similar.  
 
[TABLE 5] 
 
The amount of remittances decreases with a migrant’s education. Men remit more than 
women, and the difference is larger in the Heckman estimates, which account for men’s higher 
propensity to migrate. Migrants with spouses in destination remit less in the OLS model, an 
effect that is smaller in the Heckman estimate. In both models, migrants with children send more 
remittances; and the longer migrants stay in the destination, the less remittances they send, 
attributable to a weakening of ties to origin household. Expectedly, migrants earning higher 
wages in destination send more remittances.  
The fact that the Heckman and OLS estimates are almost identical suggests that the 
unobserved factors influencing migration do not significantly alter the effect of the observed 
factors on remittances. The insignificant correlation coefficient between the errors of the 
migration and remittance equations (ρ = 0.05) also supports this conclusion. Thus, researchers   21 
estimating a model of remittances in the MMP data can confidently ignore migrant selectivity, 
given that their intended inference is about migrants only. 
To summarize, the results from the migration models establish that wealth selectivity 
varies depending on the individual’s migration experience and the community’s migration 
prevalence. By jointly considering both patterns, this study qualifies some of the findings in prior 
work. Specifically, like Mines and Massey (1985) and Jones (1995), we show that repeat 
migrants belong to wealthy households. Considering the insights from Stark et al. (1986) and 
McKenzie and Rapoport (2007), however, we show that this pattern only holds in high migration 
prevalence communities. In additional models of remittance behavior, we show that higher 
amounts of funds reach wealthier households. In combination, these results suggest that repeat 
migration and remittances may be mechanisms for wealth accumulation. Similar to Jones (1995), 
the results may also imply a potentially growing disparity between households with migrants and 
those without them, especially in communities with high migration prevalence. We now present 
an additional analysis to examine these implications.  
 
Implications for Inequality 
We employ a descriptive analysis to trace the changes in the wealth distribution in the 119 
Mexican communities over time. Similar to the analyses in Table 4, we divide the communities 
into two roughly equally sized groups based on the proportion of individuals who have ever 
migrated by the survey year. Each group contains about 60 communities that share similar 
migration levels. 
 
[FIGURE 1] 
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Figure 1 provides a detailed graphical presentation of the changes in the migrant 
composition, remittance patterns, distribution of wealth and inequality from 1975 to 1995.
7 The 
top and bottom panels correspond to high and low migration communities, respectively. The 
panels in the first column display the percentage of first-time and repeat migrants over time. In 
the low migration group (panel 1b), the migrant population contains about equal shares of first-
time and repeat migrants, while in the high migration group (panel 1a) it comprises mostly of 
repeat migrants.  
Prior analyses showed that first-time migrants are likely to come from poor households, 
while repeat migrants originate from relatively wealthy households. This differential selectivity 
carries implications for how remittances will affect the overall inequality. That is, in the low 
migration communities, first and repeat-migrants each comprise about half of the migrant 
population. Hence the equalizing effects of remittances sent to poor households by first-time 
migrants can cancel out the inequality-inducing effects of remittances sent to wealthier 
households by repeat migrants. In the high migration communities, by contrast, repeat migrants 
make up a larger share of the migrant population than first-time migrants. Then, the inequality-
inducing effects of remittances by repeat migrants will overwhelm the equalizing effects of 
remittances by first-time migrants. This expectation rests on one crucial assumption, however, 
that repeat migrants send remittances in similar (or greater) amounts compared to first-time 
migrants.  
                                                 
7 Communities were surveyed in different years by the MMP, therefore our sample contains a 
different number of communities in each year. The number of communities is 119 in 1975, drops 
to 85 in 1995, and then to 48 by 2000. Therefore, we restrict this analysis to the 1975-1995 
period, during which the majority of the communities are observed consistently.   23 
To check this assumption empirically, the panels in column (2) of Figure 1 show the 
average monthly remittances (US$ per capita) sent by first-time and repeat migrants pooled over 
five-year periods. (Because remittance information is recorded for a migrant’s last trip alone, 
there are a small number of observations per year.) In the pool of high migration communities 
(panel 2a), remittances per capita increase over time, at a higher rate than the increase in the 
percentage of migrants (shown in panel 1a), and come mostly from repeat migrants as opposed to 
first-time migrants. By contrast, in the low migration villages, remittances are much lower, and 
equally likely to come from migrants on their first or repeat trips. Separate analysis shows that in 
all villages combined, first-time migrants send $469 on average, compared to $595 sent by repeat 
migrants. This difference (significant at the 0.001 level) may be attributed to the higher earning 
potential of repeat migrants afforded by prior experience in destination.
8   
Given that the same individuals migrate repeatedly and continue to send remittances in 
the high migration communities, households with migrants are likely to accumulate wealth 
quickly. The panels in column (3) compare the average wealth (number of rooms in properties) 
among non-migrants, first-time migrants and repeat migrants. (Due to the retrospective nature of 
the data, older, and consequently, wealthier individuals are observed in later years. To assure that 
the same age group is compared across time, we restrict the analysis to 25-45 year olds in each 
year.)  In high migration communities (panel 3a), households with repeat migrants own on 
average 3 rooms, a number that is significantly higher than the 2.5 rooms owned by households 
of non-migrants and first-time migrants. The differences are negligible in low migration 
                                                 
8 The estimates in Table 5 showed that remittances decrease by 6 percent per year a migrant 
spends in destination. These estimates control for earnings differences among migrants, and 
therefore are not inconsistent with the raw comparisons presented here.    24 
communities (panel 3b), where an average household, regardless of its migration status, owns 
about 2.5 rooms, a figure that remains constant over time. 
These patterns provide further evidence that migration is a mechanism for wealth 
accumulation, and imply dramatic changes in the distribution of wealth in communities with high 
levels of migration. To isolate the changes in wealth inequality due to migration and remittance 
flows, the panels in column (4) show the inequality in the number of properties owned between 
migrant and non-migrant households as a percentage of total inequality (measured with the gini 
coefficient).  
In the low migration communities (panel 4b), the inequality due to differences between 
migrants and non-migrants is negligible and stable over time. By contrast, in communities with 
high levels of migration (panel 4a), the inequality between migrants and non-migrants increases 
dramatically over time. From 1975 to 1995, the share of inequality due to the wealth gap 
between migrants and non-migrants increases from 0.05 to almost 0.15.   
These results are not informative of the overall trends in wealth inequality, which may 
change due to unobserved contextual factors or idiosyncratic economic shocks. Yet, the results 
suggest that, between 1975 and 1995, migration and remittance flows may be associated with an 
increasing divide between households that send migrants to the United States and those that do 
not, especially in the MMP communities with a high migration prevalence. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
In a period when inequalities between countries have reached a “great plateau,” 
understanding the disparities within countries has become crucial to predict future trends in 
global inequality (Firebaugh 1999, 2000). Despite their growing magnitude and importance for   25 
the developing regions of the world, remittance flows have not been considered as an integral 
component of within-country inequalities. This study focused on the largest contemporary 
migration stream in the world, which is between Mexico and the United States and generates the 
largest remittance flows to Latin America, the most unequal region of the world. 
To explore the distributional impact of migration-remittance flows in the migrant-sending 
communities of Mexico, we studied how individuals’ wealth status is associated with their 
propensity to migrate and remit. Using the Mexican Migration Project data from about 18,000 
individuals in 119 communities from 1965 to 2008, we first investigated the wealth selectivity of 
migrants. Prior work suggested that the selectivity would vary by the migration prevalence of the 
community or the prior migration experience of the individual. Investigating both patterns, we 
found that first-time migrants in low prevalence communities originate from poor households 
(with an average $3,305 in land and 2.1 rooms in properties), while repeat migrants in high 
prevalence communities belong to wealthy households (with an average $11,124 in land and 3.2 
rooms in properties). Subsequently, we estimated an integrated statistical model, which treated 
migration as a mechanism for selection in a Heckman specification of remittances, and showed a 
higher amount of remittances reaching wealthier households. Based on these results, we 
suggested that repeat migration and remittances might be mechanisms for wealth accumulation. 
Using descriptive analyses, we further associated these mechanisms with growing wealth 
disparities between migrant and non-migrants households, especially in high migration 
prevalence communities.  
These results united the findings from two lines of prior research. First, in their seminal 
work, Stark et al. (1986) suggested that inequality in a community would initially increase due to 
the migration of the wealthy, but eventually decline as migration gained prevalence and became   26 
a less selective endeavor. Second, in their case studies of Mexican communities, Mines and 
Massey (1985) and Jones (1995) found that migrants made multiple trips, sent continued 
remittances and accumulated wealth over time. This recursive pattern led to an increasing 
concentration of wealth among migrants, and a growing disparity between migrants and non-
migrants.  
This study considered these two patterns jointly, and identified the scope conditions for 
some of the prior findings. Similar to Mines and Massey (1985), for example, we found that 
migrant households accumulate wealth over repeat migration trips. We also observed an 
increasing wealth disparity between migrant and non-migrant households. By studying low and 
high migration prevalence communities separately as Stark et al. (1986) recommend, however, 
we discovered that these patterns hold only in high migration prevalence communities.  
Our statistical and descriptive analysis focused on identifying the potential effect of 
migration and remittance flows on the wealth inequality between migrant and non-migrants 
households in 119 communities. We did not consider the impact of these flows on the overall 
wealth inequality in a community, or on the wealth inequality between communities. Prior 
research showed the sensitivity of inequality trends to the scale of analysis. Jones (1998), for 
example, found that migration and remittance flows increased inter-household inequality in 4 
Mexican communities, but decreased the inequality between these communities and urban 
centers. Lozano (2007) similarly observed varying effects of remittances in rural and urban 
regions. Our study did not investigate such differential effects. Our study also did not consider 
the ‘multiplier’ effects of remittances. As numerous studies show, migrants’ remittances may 
increase expenditures in the local economy and create new employment opportunities for both 
migrants and non-migrants (Adams 1998; Cohen 1999; Cohen and Rodriguez 2005; Conway and   27 
Cohen 1998; Durand 1994; Durand et al. 1996b; Jones 1995; Massey and Parrado 1998; Smith 
1998; Taylor et al. 1996; Woodruff and Zenteno 2007). These indirect effects, if taken into 
account, might alter our conclusions about how remittances shape the wealth inequality between 
migrants and non-migrants in the MMP communities. 
Future work can address this limitation, and study both the direct and indirect effects of 
migration and remittance flows on inequality, and at various scales of analysis. Researchers can 
also use a longitudinal research design to investigate trends in inequality, and specifically 
explore individuals’ migration, remittance and wealth trajectories over time. This approach was 
not possible here because the MMP data only recorded remittances during the last migration trip. 
Finally, in the Mexican setting, future studies can investigate remittances from all migrants, not 
just the household heads measured in the MMP, using different data sets (for example, the 
ENADID, the national demographic dynamics survey from Mexico). 
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APPENDIX A 
Distribution of Household Wealth and Remittances in Mexico 
 
 
[FIGURE A1] 
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APPENDIX B 
Testing the Validity of the Distance-Prevalence Interaction as an Instrument for Migration 
 [TABLE B1] 
 
The first column of Table B1 presents the marginal effects of distance by community 
migration prevalence estimated in a probit model of U.S. migration. Migration prevalence is 
defined as the proportion of individuals who ever migrated in a community. (The Pearson’s 
correlation between distance and prevalence is only -0.02.) Showing a non-linear pattern, 
distance to border increases the odds of migrating, while its squared term decreases it. The effect 
of distance also depends on the migration prevalence in the community. For individuals in zero 
migration prevalence communities, for example, increasing the distance to border from zero to 
1000 kilometers decreases the probability of migrating by about seven-fold. For individuals in 
medium prevalence communities, where about 13 percent of individuals have migrated, a similar 
increase in distance decreases the probability of migrating by only three-fold. As expected, the 
negative effect of distance is concentrated among individuals living in communities with low 
migration prevalence, and suggest the validity of the interaction term for explaining variation in 
migration. As an alternative check for instrument validity, we tested for weak instruments by 
excluding the distance-prevalence interaction from the migration model. The resulting F-
statistics was 115.6 (df=487,225), more than ten-fold the lower bound of 10 required to reject the 
hypothesis of weak instruments (Staiger and Stock 1997).  
  To provide evidence for instrument exogeneity, which is not directly testable, we 
examine the partial correlations between the instrument and migrants’ U.S. wages, which are 
strongly correlated with remittances. If the instrument is associated with the unobserved 
determinants of remittances, we would expect it to be correlated with the observed measures,   30 
such as U.S. wages, as well. The regression results in the second model of Table B1 show that 
distance to border and migration prevalence in community have statistically insignificant 
associations with migrants’ U.S. wages. Overall the evidence in Table B1 suggests the distance-
prevalence interaction as a valid source of identification in the Heckman model.  
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Figure 1. Changes in Migrant Composition, Remittance Patterns, Wealth Distribution and Inequality in High vs. Low Migration 
Communities in the MMP Data (1975-1995) 
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Figure A1. Distribution of Household Assets and Funds from Migrants 
Note: Households with no land (85%) and no property (50%) are excluded from the 
respective panels (a) and (b). Households with migrants that receive no remittances (21%) 
and no savings (22%) are excluded from panels (c) and (d). 